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We use plant output and input prices to decompose the profit margin into four parts: productivity,
demand shocks, mark-ups and input costs. We find that each of these market fundamentals are important
in explaining plant exit. We then use variation across sectors in tariff changes after the Colombian
trade reform to assess whether the impact of market fundamentals on plant exit changed with increased
international competition. We find that greater international competition magnifies the impact of productivity,
and other market fundamentals, on plant exit. A dynamic simulation that compares the distribution
of productivity with and without the trade reform shows that improvements in market selection from
trade reform help to weed out the least productive plants and increase average productivity. In addition,
we find that trade liberalization increases productivity of incumbent plants and improves the allocation
of activity within industries.
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It is clear that an important means by which market economies restructure and innovate
is through the entry and exit of establishments. Consistent with that view, in economies
like the U.S., the entry and exit process has been identi￿ed as an important component
of aggregate productivity growth. Aggregate productivity growth is achieved, in part, by
the ongoing market selection process that involves the exit of low productivity businesses
and the entry of businesses that exhibit either higher relative productivity at entry or
rapid productivity growth in their ￿rst few years.1
Given the importance of business turnover for productivity growth, rigid market
institutions and concentrated market structures can be expected to a⁄ect aggregate
productivity by raising barriers to both entry and exit. Barriers on either margin are
likely to reduce the overall pace of ￿rm and establishment turnover and to generate
misallocation of activity in the economy. Recent theoretical models, indeed, show that
poor market institutions (including trade barriers) generate misallocation by introduc-
ing idiosyncratic distortions to pro￿tability (see Banerjee and Du￿ o (2005), Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and Bartelsman et al. (2008)).
Surprisingly, early evidence for developing economies shows that the pace of estab-
lishment turnover is typically not that di⁄erent from that observed for industrialized
economies.2 This is at odds with the idea that developing economies, which are typi-
cally subject to more restrictive institutions, should have a slower pace of reallocation.
On the other hand, recent ￿ndings from both emerging and transition economies suggest
that market reforms improve allocative e¢ ciency (e.g., Bartelsman et al. (2008), Eslava
et al. (2004, 2006, 2009)). By contrast to these recent studies, in this paper, we explore
the link between market selection and a particular area of market reform ￿namely, trade
liberalization.
Trade liberalization has been a core component of market reforms in developing
economies and, in particular, in Latin America. Trade liberalization could a⁄ect plant
exits and productivity through a number of channels. First, as Pavcnik (2002) and
others argue, increased international competition may induce incumbent ￿rms to become
more productive.3 Second, Melitz (2003) shows that trade liberalization could force
1See, e.g., Baily, Campbell and Hulten (1992), Bartelsman and Doms (2000), Foster, Haltiwanger
and Krizan (2001), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008), and Olley and Pakes (1996).
2See, e.g., Bartelsman et al. (2008) and Tybout (2000).
3A number of studies ￿nd that productivity of incumbent producers increases after trade opening,
including: Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey, Harrison (1994) for Cote d￿ Ivoire, Tybout and Westbrook
2lower productivity ￿rms out of the market, cutting o⁄ the lower tail of the productivity
distribution. In a related vein, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) show that less regulated
environments enhance the role of productivity as a determinant of plant survival. In
our empirical analysis we focus on the direct and indirect impacts of trade on exits, as
suggested by the recent literature.
An important aspect of trade opening in Colombia is that it varied widely across
sectors. This between-sector, within country, variation re￿ ects substantial di⁄erences in
tari⁄ changes across di⁄erent sectors, as well as substantial di⁄erences in initial tari⁄
levels. The large variation in the extent of trade opening across sectors, along with rich
longitudinal establishment-level data for the manufacturing sector of Colombia provides
a unique opportunity to explore the impact of trade liberalization on market selection.
Not only do we explore the direct impact of the reduction of trade barriers on exits, but
we also explore how reduced trade barriers a⁄ected the role of market fundamentals on
plant exits in Colombia. In particular, we explore how trade liberalization a⁄ected the
role of idiosyncratic (i.e., plant-level) total factor productivity, demand shocks, mark-
ups and cost variation. Finally, we explore whether increased exit of low productivity
plants following trade reform leads to increases in average productivity.4
A novel feature of our analysis is the separate measurement of physical productivity
(rather than revenue-based productivity), idiosyncratic demand, mark-ups and input
costs, which allows us to evaluate separately the impact that each of these determinants
has on plant exit. By contrast, previous analyses of exit patterns after trade liberalization
rely on reduced form plant characteristics related to survival, such as size and age, rather
than market fundamentals which directly determine exit (e.g., Gibson and Harris (1996),
Baggs (2005), and Bernard and Jensen (2007)). Unlike previous analyses, we are able to
measure these fundamentals separately because the Colombian Manufacturing Survey
allows to construct plant-level prices of both inputs and outputs. This unique feature of
(1995) for Mexico, Pavcnik (2002) for Chile, Tre￿ er (2004) for Canada, Topalova (2004) for India, and
Fernandes (2007) for Colombia.
4In our earlier work (i.e., Eslava et al. (2006)), we show that some market fundamentals became
more important determinants of plant exit in the 1990s relative to the 1980s in Colombia. The 1990s
was a period of market reforms on many dimensions including trade, ￿nancial market, labor market,
privatization, and tax reforms. In contrast to this paper, our earlier work made no attempt to identify
the impact of particular reforms on market selection, and did not exploit the cross-sectional variation of
regulations. Moreover, our earlier work also had less detailed measures of fundamentals (e.g., we lacked
a measure of market power). Finally, our earlier work did not look at the implications of selection for
average productivity, nor did it explore some of the alternative channels of the impact of trade reform
on aggregate productivity that we study here.
3the data is useful for our purposes in several ways. First, we are able to de￿ ate output
with plant-speci￿c de￿ ators, leading to a measure of TFP that has been stripped of
idiosyncratic demand e⁄ects. Our approach contrasts with most of the literature, where
the measurement of TFP uses plant-level revenue de￿ ated with a sector-level price index.
Given within sector price variability, the standard estimation of TFP confounds high
physical e¢ ciency and high prices. Second, we are able to estimate demand shocks at
the plant level due to the availability of plant-level output prices. In our estimation
of the demand process, we also allow mark-ups to vary across plants. Consistent with
theories of market selection, we ￿nd that plants with higher productivity, those facing
lower input prices, and those subject to positive demand shocks and with more inelastic
demands, are less likely to exit.
Moreover, we ￿nd that market fundamentals (with the exception of the mark-up)
become more important in determining plant survival, as competition increases due to
trade opening. In particular, we ￿nd that the marginal e⁄ect of productivity on exit
increases in sectors facing declines in tari⁄s. Given improved market selection, we explore
the implications for aggregate productivity by conducting a dynamic counterfactual
simulation of the exit process under two scenarios: one with the actual tari⁄ levels and
another one leaving the tari⁄s at their initial, 1984, levels. We ￿nd an increase in average
plant-level productivity of about 3.3 log points due to improved market selection with
the actual tari⁄s relative to the 1984 tari⁄s. This analysis is novel, as previous studies
do not explore the impact of increased selectivity in plant exits on average productivity
after trade opening.5
In addition, we consider some alternative channels through which trade liberalization
can a⁄ect productivity to put our ￿ndings on market selection in context. In particular,
following Pavcnik (2002), we use a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences speci￿cation to quantify
the impact of trade reform on within plant productivity growth for continuing plants.
Our results reinforce Pavcnik￿ s (2002) main ￿nding that trade opening increases within-
plant productivity growth, making use of the improved measures of trade opening and
productivity that are available for Colombia. In particular, we use tari⁄s that vary
within-sector and over time, while in the Chilean case studied by Pavcnik tari⁄s varied
only over time so that tari⁄ reductions had to be captured through time dummies in
her analysis. In addition, our TFP measure captures physical productivity rather than
a revenue-based measure of productivity which combines withing sector di⁄erences in
5See, e.g., Gibson and Harris (1996) for New Zeland￿ s trade liberalization; Head and Ries (1999)
and Baggs (2005) for Canada and NAFTA; Bernard and Jensen(2007) for FDI in the United States.
4prices and physical e¢ ciency e⁄ects. Another channel we explore is whether trade
opening strengthens the relationship between market size and productivity as discussed
by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Bartelsman et al. (2008). We ￿nd, indeed, that sectors
facing lower tari⁄s show larger correlations between market share and productivity,
indicating that trade opening increases the share of productive plants and reduces the
market share of less productive plants.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the theoretical
considerations that motivate our empirical analysis. In Section 3, we describe the market
reforms introduced in Colombia during the 1990s. In Section 4, we present the data from
the Annual Manufacturing Survey. In Section 5, we show our results on the impact of
the pro￿t margin components, and the interaction of these market fundamentals with
trade reforms on exit probabilities. In Section 6, we present the implications of trade-
related exits for average productivity and explore alternative channels through which
tari⁄ reductions may have a⁄ected productivity. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Theoretical Considerations
According to selection models of industry dynamics (e.g., Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn
(1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995)) producers should continue operations if the discounted
value of future pro￿ts exceeds the opportunity cost of remaining in operation. At the
same time, recent models (e.g., Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Foster et
al. (2008)) emphasize that many market fundamentals in￿ uence variation in pro￿tabil-
ity across producers. In this literature, producers with market power make decisions on
outputs, inputs, and output prices, given productivity shocks, demand shocks, demand
elasticity and input price shocks drawn by the producer from a joint distribution. These
models also assume that ￿rms face frictions in the market through entry barriers. Typ-
ically, producers are assumed not to know their market fundamentals prior to entry,
pay an entry fee and obtain their ￿rst draw of their market fundamentals from a joint
distribution. The market fundamentals are assumed to evolve stochastically over time
and consistent with the recent empirical literature are assumed to be highly persistent
processes. Given ￿xed costs of operating each period, the producer makes a decision on
whether or not to stay or exit at each point in time. As derived in the recent literature,
the canonical exit decision can be modeled as being given by:6
6See, e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Foster et al. (2008) for models that yield exit speci￿ca-
tions with this full list of market fundamentals (or plant pro￿t-margin components).
5ejt =
(
1 if PDV f￿(TFPjt;PIjt;Djt;"jt) ￿ Cjtg < 0
0 if PDV f￿(TFPjt;PIjt;Djt;"jt) ￿ Cjtg ￿ 0
That is, plant j exits if the expected present net discounted value of pro￿ts including
the ￿xed cost of operating Cjt is negative.7 Current and future expected pro￿ts, ￿,
(and, in turn, their present discounted value, PDV) gross of ￿xed costs are a positive
function of demand, Djt and productivity shocks, TFPjt, a positive function of the
demand elasticity, "jt (where the latter is negative so an increase implies an increase in
the mark-up) and a decreasing function of input price shocks, PIjt.
In what follows, we estimate this speci￿cation of market selection for Colombia. The
estimates for the basic model are of interest in their own right, since Colombia is unique
in having rich data with plant-level measures of each of these fundamentals, including
demand shocks and demand elasticities. Our primary purpose is, however, to explore
the role of market reforms and, in particular, trade liberalization on the market selection
process.
Theory suggests that trade liberalization enhances the mechanism that drives low
productivity and other under-performing plants out of the market. For example, Melitz
(2003) develops a monopolistic competition model where trade liberalization impacts
market selection through equilibrium wages. As the economy liberalizes, the more pro-
ductive plants expand by increasing exports and this drives up the equilibrium wage.
With a higher wage, only incumbents with productivity above a larger threshold survive.
At the same time, Bernard et al. (2003) introduce stochastic plant productivity in a
perfect competition Ricardian model where producers from the same country compete
to be the sole national supplier to speci￿c destinations. Lower trade barriers bump
out low-productivity plants due to import competition, while high productivity plants
grow into export markets. As labor shifts from low-productivity exiting plants to high-
productivity expanding plants, there is a rise in aggregate productivity.8
7The ￿xed cost of operating Cjt should be de￿ned as being net of the option value for the plant of
waiting to exit. This option value arises due to the irreversibility stemming from sunk entry costs.
8Our empirical analysis is closer to Bernard et al. (2003), as we focus on the e⁄ects of trade reform on
market selection for a given set of fundamentals. By contrast, Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) emphasize how exit will be impacted by trade through changes in fundamentals (i.e., wages and
mark-ups, respectively). While these channels are likely important, studying the impact of trade on
wages empirically requires richer wage data than we have from the Monthly Manufacturing Survey.
For instance, the studies by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) and Attanasio et al. (2004) highlight the
complex mechanisms through which trade may a⁄ect average wages and the distribution of wages using
6Another channel suggested by the recent literature on misallocation and productiv-
ity (e.g., Banerjee and Du￿ o (2005), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) and Bartelsman et al. (2008)) is the increased relative importance of market
fundamentals for exit when trade is liberalized. In these models, distortions to markets
include an idiosyncratic component. In our context, trade barriers potentially yield idio-
syncratic distortions as they may vary across sectors yielding more favorable treatment
for some ￿rms and less favorable treatment of other ￿rms. A key insight from this class
of models is that, in addition to the pro￿t-margin components discussed above, these
idiosyncratic distortions impact pro￿tability and, in turn, market selection. Thus, in
the presence of idiosyncratic distortions, a plant￿ s survival becomes less related to its
favorable pro￿t-margin fundamentals, and more to regulations. For instance, protec-
tions (including trade protections) to speci￿c sectors may allow ￿rms in these sectors to
survive even with relatively low productivity. On the other hand, when these protections
are eliminated, ￿rms will only be able to survive if they have relatively high productivity.
Given the possible mechanisms through which trade liberalization can impact market




1 if PDV f￿(TFPjt;PIjt;Djt;"jt;￿jt) ￿ Cjtg < 0
0 if PDV f￿(TFPjt;PIjt;Djt;"jt;￿jt) ￿ Cjtg ￿ 0
where ￿jt represents market distortions for plant j including those from trade barriers.
While we are not able to measure the full set of market distortions impacting any
given plant, we have one good measure of distortions, namely tari⁄s. A key working
hypothesis of our empirical analysis is that the plants in sectors with the largest decreases
in tari⁄s are, holding other things equal (e.g., including other reforms), more likely to
have seen a larger reduction in their market distortions. As noted above, a key insight
from the recent literature is that the presence of idiosyncratic distortions across plants
reduces the marginal e⁄ect of fundamentals on the probability of exit.9 This insight helps
guide and interpret our empirical speci￿cation of the market selection models presented
below. Our core identifying assumption is that sectors with greater tari⁄ reductions
household data for Colombia. Exploring the impact of trade liberalization via changes in mark-ups
would require a careful and detailed study of mark-ups similar to the studies of trade on wages by
Goldberg and Pacvnik (2005) and Attanasio et al. (2004). Exploring these alternative channels is an
interesting area we intend to study in future work.
9The analysis in Bartelsman et al. (2008) shows that an increase in the dispersion of idiosyncratic
distortions decreases the marginal e⁄ect of market fundamentals, like productivity, on plant exit.
7have had a larger reduction in market distortions and, accordingly, fundamentals should
become incrementally more relevant for market selection in the sectors with greater tari⁄
declines. As will become clear, in practice when we estimate the above speci￿cation, we
include controls and estimate ￿ exible speci￿cations, including both direct and interaction
e⁄ects, to capture the impact of trade and other reforms.
3 Trade Reforms in Colombia
Colombia underwent substantial changes in trade policy during the past three decades.
After considerable trade liberalization in the 1970s, the administration of president Belis-
ario Betancurt implemented a reversal towards protection during the early 1980s in re-
sponse to the appreciation of the exchange rate, which had contributed to increased
foreign competition. Betancurt￿ s policies increased the average tari⁄ level to 27 percent
in 1984, but the degree of protection across industries was far from uniform. Manu-
facturing sectors bene￿ted the most from increased protection as the average tari⁄ in
manufacturing rose to 50 percent. However, even within manufacturing some sectors
received more protection than others. The sector with the highest protection was tex-
tiles and apparel, which had nominal tari⁄s of nearly 90 percent, and wood products
followed with a nominal tari⁄ of 60 percent. These two sectors also had the highest
levels of protection through non-tari⁄ barriers.
While barriers to trade were reduced in the second half of the 1980s, trade was
largely liberalized in Colombia during the ￿rst half of the 1990s. Figure 1 shows average
e⁄ective tari⁄s and the standard deviation of e⁄ective tari⁄s starting in 1984.10 From
this initial level, the ￿gure shows a substantial decline both in average e⁄ective tari⁄s
and the dispersion of these tari⁄s in 1985. The ￿gure then shows a gradual decrease
in tari⁄s which started during the administration of president Virgilio Barco in the late
1980s.
In 1990, the administration of president Cesar Gaviria introduced a comprehensive
reform package, which included measures to modernize the state and liberalize markets.
Reforms during the 1990s occurred in the areas of trade, ￿nancial and labor markets,
privatization and the tax system.11 Probably the most important of all these reforms
10The e⁄ective tari⁄ for a given ￿nal good adjusts the nominal tari⁄ levied to the good itself, by
substracting the weighted sum of tari⁄s on the inputs used to produce that good, where the weights
are given by the share of the input in production costs for that good (using the corresponding entry in
the Input-Output table).
11A number of studies have examined the impacts of non-trade reforms on workers and ￿rms. Kugler
8was the trade reform carried out at the beginning of the 1990s.
The average nominal tari⁄declined from 27 to about 10 percent overall, and from 50
to 13 percent in manufacturing, between 1984 and 1998. As Figure 1 shows, there was a
drastic drop in average e⁄ective tari⁄s and in the dispersion of e⁄ective tari⁄s between
1990 and 1992 during the Gaviria administration. By 1992, the average e⁄ective tari⁄
was at 26.6% compared to 62.5% in 1989 and compared to 86% in 1984. Similarly, the
dispersion of tari⁄s fell substantially during the early 1990s, though dispersion across
industries still remained substantial as the standard deviation of tari⁄s remained at
around 0.2.
After Gaviria￿ s term, Ernesto Samper won the presidential election in 1994 based
on a platform which partly opposed trade liberalization and other reforms.12 While the
new government did not dismantle the existing reforms at the time, it managed to stop
the momentum for further liberalization. This is clear in Figure 1, which shows that the
average and standard deviation of e⁄ective tari⁄s remain ￿ at after 1992.
The description above makes clear that there were important changes in both the
mean level and the dispersion of tari⁄s across sectors. An interesting aspect of the
Colombian trade reforms is that at the same time that the overall level of protection
was lowered, the sectoral structure of protection was also substantially altered as barriers
to trade were lowered to similar levels across sectors irrespective of their initial level.
The identi￿cation strategy of our analysis of the e⁄ect of market reforms on market
selection exploits this cross-sectional variation in tari⁄ reductions.
4 Data
Since we are interested in estimating the impact of market fundamentals on exit as
trade opens, we require information on tari⁄s, and on plant characteristics, including:
productivity, demand shocks, demand elasticities, and input prices. Also, to control
for other ongoing reforms that may had coincided with the trade reforms, in some
speci￿cations we require a measure of other regulations. In this section, we provide a
(1999, 2005) studies the impact of the 1991 labor market reforms, Kugler and Kugler (2009) studies
the impact of the 1993 payroll tax reform; Kugler (2006) studies the impact of the 1992 FDI reform,
and Eslava et al. (2009) study the impact of the 1991 labor and capital market reforms.
12Note that the Colombian electoral system at the time ruled out re-election after one term in o¢ ce,
which may help explain the depth of the structural reforms in Colombia in the absence of an economic
crisis.
9description of the data, and we then explain the measurement of physical productivity
and demand shocks.
4.1 Data Description
We use data from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS), an unbalanced
panel that registers information on all manufacturing establishments with 10 or more
employees. Establishments with less than 10 employees but with a nominal value of
production over a certain level are also included.13 Given that these requirements are
satis￿ed, a plant is then included in our sample in a given year if it reports positive
production for that year. We have data covering the 1982-1998 period, at an annual
frequency. The AMS records include information on the value of production, number
of employees, value of materials used, physical units of energy demanded, value of the
stock of capital and purchases of capital, as well as the quantities of each product it
manufactures and of each material it uses.
4.1.1 Plant-level Prices of Inputs and Output
We start by constructing output and material price indices for each establishment, using
the information on individual products and materials for each plant. To create a plant-
level index of material prices, we ￿rst calculate weighted averages of the price changes
of all individual materials used by the plant.14 The weight assigned to each input
corresponds to the average share (over the whole period) of that input in the total value
of materials used by the plant.15 Plant-level price indices are then generated recursively
from these plant-level price changes, where we set 1982 as the base year. Given the
recursive method used to construct the price indices and the fact that we do not have
plant-level information for material prices for the years before plants enter the sample,
13For instance, for 1998 the value limit was set at U$35,000.
14Since some large outliers appear, we trim the 1% percent tails of the distribution of plant-level
price changes. In addition, given that the in￿ ation rate in Colombia has hovered around 18% during
the period, we choose to drop observations that show reductions of prices beyond 50% in absolute value
or increases in prices beyond 200%.
15An alternative speci￿cation would be to use a Divisia index approach letting the share in any given
year be the average of the share in the current and prior year. We have used this alternative approach
and obtain similar results. However, we ￿nd some anomalous large and transitory ￿ uctuations in the
shares suggesting problems with measurement error. Given these concerns, we use a more conservative
approach using the average over the entire period.
10we replace missing values with the average material price in the plant￿ s sector, location,
and year.16 A similar method is used to construct output price indices.
We use plant-level output prices to construct physical quantities of output, which are
measured as the nominal output de￿ ated by the plant-level price index. Similarly, we
construct physical quantities of materials used as the nominal value of these materials
de￿ ated by the plant-level materials price index. Physical quantities of energy usage are
directly reported at the plant-level.
4.1.2 Capital Stock
We construct a series of the capital stock for each plant, j, following the perpetual
inventory method. Gross investment is generated from the information on ￿xed assets









jt is the reported ￿nal value of ￿xed assets by plant j at the end of year t;
KNI
jt is the reported initial value of ￿xed assets reported by plant j at the start of year
t, djt is the depreciation reported by plant j at the end of year t, and ￿A
jt is the reported
in￿ ation adjustment to ￿xed asset value by plant j at the end of year t (only relevant
since 1995, the ￿rst year in which plants were required by law to consider this component
in their calculations of end-of-year ￿xed assets). We de￿ ate gross investment using a
de￿ ator for capital formation from National Accounts￿Input-Output matrices (or the
equivalent ￿output utilization matrices￿since 1994); the de￿ ator varies in general at the
2-digit sector level, and for a few sectors at a higher level of disaggregation. Denote this
de￿ ator as DS(j)t where S(j) is the sector to which plant j belongs. The plant capital









where ￿S(j) is the depreciation rate for the 3-digit sector to which plant j belongs calcu-
lated by Pombo (1999). We initialize the capital stock for each plant using the nominal
capital stock ￿rst ever recorded (at the beginning of year), KNI
jt0 , de￿ ated by the average
capital de￿ ator for the current and previous years, DS(j)t0 and DS(j)t0￿1:
16When the information is not available by location, we impute the national average in the sector
for that year. This imputation assumes that the plant that is about to enter would have had a similar








The level of employment or the number of workers is reported directly by each estab-
lishment. Since hours per worker are not reported in the AMS, we construct a measure
of labor usage, by using information on average wages at the 3-digit sector level from
the Monthly Manufacturing Survey.17 Our measure of hours per worker in sector S(j)





where wS(j)t is the measure of sectoral hourly wages at the 3-digit level, and earningsS(j)t









4.1.4 Descriptive Statistics of Plant-level variables
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the quantity and price variables just described.18
The price and quantity variables are expressed in logs. We restrict our sample to plants
in three-digit sectors with more than 25 establishments in the average year, since we
make use of within-sector variation in our analysis below. In the next section, we use
the variables summarized in Table 1 to estimate the production function and inverse-
demand equation.
Table 1 also shows entry and exit rates. A plant is classi￿ed as entering in t if it
exists in our sample in year t but not in t ￿ 1. Similarly, the plant exits in t if it exists
17Data on sector wages are reported separately for production and non-production workers. We use
a weighted average of the wages of those two categories, where the weights are the shares of each type
of worker in total sector employment. We de￿ ate the nominal wages using the CPI obtained from the
National Department of Statistics.
18The descriptive statistics capture both within industry as well as between industry variation. In the
empirical analysis, we always control for industry e⁄ects, so we focus our attention on within industry
variation (across plants and across time) in our estimation. Interestingly, we have generated a version
of Table 1 that removes industry e⁄ects and ￿nd very similar patterns, suggesting that much of the
between plant variation in outputs, inputs and prices re￿ ects within industry variation.
12in the sample in t but not in t + 1. Note that Table 1 reports entry and exit rates of
7% and 9% respectively, somewhat lower than those reported for developed countries
(Davis et al. (1996)). These lower entry and exit rates for Colombia are consistent with
the perception that developing economies are subject to greater rigidities than more
developed countries (see Tybout (2000) for a discussion of this issue).
4.1.5 Tari⁄s and Reform data
Our data on e⁄ective tari⁄s come from the National Planning Department. E⁄ective
tari⁄s are available at the product level for each year, using a classi￿cation system (and
therefore product identi￿ers) that were created for the Andean Community. Since the
tari⁄s￿database also assigns each of these products a four-digit sector ISIC code, we
can construct e⁄ective tari⁄s at the four-digit level by averaging e⁄ective tari⁄s across
products in a given sector. The only other study of the impact of trade liberalization
on productivity with a similar level of disaggregation of tari⁄s is that by Tre￿ er (2004).
Having e⁄ective tari⁄s at this high level of dissagregation allows us to still control for
sector e⁄ects in our estimation, using 2-digit sector dummies which may capture other
factors a⁄ecting exits. On the other hand, the fact that we use sector-level rather than
plant-level tari⁄s reduces concerns about tari⁄s being in￿ uenced by individual ￿rms. In
addition, we limit our analysis to 3-digit sectors with more than 25 establishments in the
average year. Moreover, as a robustness check, we drop the most concentrated sectors
(based on a Her￿ndahl Index) from our analysis and ￿nd no di⁄erences with our results
based on the overall sample.
We also use an index of reforms other than trade in some of our speci￿cations.
We construct this index from the institutions index produced by Lora (2001). Lora
generates indices of market reform in each of ￿ve areas: labor regulation, ￿nancial
sector regulation, trade openness, privatization and taxation. He then averaged those
individual indices to construct an index of overall reform. The indices for individual
areas of regulation fall in a 0-1 scale, where 0 (1) corresponds to the most (least) rigid
institutions in Latin America over the period for each of the ￿ve categories that compose
the aggregate index. We modify Lora￿ s index in two ways. First, we exclude trade reform
from the calculation of the overall index, since we look at trade institutions directly
through tari⁄s. Second, we use a di⁄erent 0-1 scale, where the index in each category
is calculated relative to the minimum and maximum level of reform in Colombia during
the period, rather than relative to the minimum and maximum for Latin America. The
Lora index is only available since 1985, so that the regression analysis that includes this
13index as a control is restricted to the period 1985-1998.
The evolution of the means and standard deviations of e⁄ective tari⁄s, as well as
the index of other reforms (which only varies over time) are shown in Figure 1. As
described above, both the mean and the standard deviation of e⁄ective tari⁄s go down
signi￿cantly between 1984 and 1992, and then show little variation. Figure 1 also shows
that the index of other reforms, which goes up during the 1990s when market reforms are
implemented, increased at the same time that tari⁄s were being reduced. This highlights
the importance of controlling for other reforms in our estimation.
4.2 Estimation of Productivity and Demand Shocks
We begin by estimating production and demand functions at the plant level, to obtain
measures of TFP, demand shifters and the elasticity of demand. Following Eslava et
al. (2004), our TFP estimates are constructed using factor elasticities estimated using
downstream demand to instrument inputs, while our demand estimation uses TFP as
an instrument.
4.2.1 Total Factor Productivity










where, Yjt is output, Kjt is capital, Ljt is total employment, Hjt are hours per worker,
Ejt is energy consumption, Mjt are materials, and Vjt is a productivity shock.
Our total factor productivity measure is estimated as:
TFPjt = logYjt ￿ b ￿logKjt ￿ b ￿(logLjt + logHjt) ￿ b ￿ logEjt ￿ b ￿logMjt: (1)
where b ￿, b ￿, b ￿, and b ￿ are the estimated factor elasticities for capital, labor hours, energy,
and materials. Since productivity shocks are likely to be correlated with inputs, OLS
estimates of factor elasticities are likely to be biased. We thus rely on IV estimates, where
the instruments are demand shifters, input prices, and government spending which are
likely correlated with input but uncorrelated with productivity shocks. A more detailed
description of this estimation and its results can be found in Eslava et al. (2004).19
19Although the sample di⁄ers slightly because we drop observations from sectors with few establish-
ments, the estimated factor elasticities we report here are the same as those in Eslava et al. (2004) up
to the second decimal place.
14Table 2 presents summary statistics for our TFP measure estimated with instrumen-
tal variables (labeled TFP in this Table), and compares it to alternative measures of
productivity. All statistics are computed at the three-digit level. We compare our IV
TFP measure with a TFP measure estimated using cost shares at the 3-digit level as
factor elasticities (TFPC) and with a TFP measure estimated using factor elasticities
from an OLS estimation of the production function (TFPO). Our TFP measure is highly
correlated with both of these alternatives, with correlation coe¢ cients above 0.85. Thus,
in spite of the di⁄erences in estimated factor elasticities obtained using various methods,
we ￿nd that the TFP distribution across plants is similar.20 The similarity between our
TFP measure and the cost shares TFP measure suggests that allowing factor elasticities
to vary across sectors is not crucial for TFP estimation in our data. In the rest of the
paper, we rely on TFP estimates based on our IV estimation.
Table 2 also shows other interesting patterns that we exploit in our analysis in the
following sections. First, the table shows considerable dispersion in plant-level prices
and TFP within sectors, which is consistent with the association between price and
productivity dispersion and frictions pointed out in recent literature. In addition, price
dispersion is consistent with the common assumption of product di⁄erentiation in the
recent literature.
Second, Table 2 shows that TFP (measured either using our preferred measure in row
1 of Table 2 or TFPC which uses the cost share factor elasticities) is inversely correlated
with plant-level prices. This is consistent with more productive plants or industries
having lower marginal costs and setting lower prices when faced with downward sloping
demand curves.21 We exploit this inverse relationship to estimate demand elasticities
20The ￿nding that the distribution of plant-level TFP is robust to alternative estimation methods
is analogous to related ￿ndings by van Biesebroeck (2006). There are alternative ways to estimate
factor elasticities in the literature such as Olley and Pakes (1996) and Blundell and Bond (1999). The
Olley and Pakes method (and related methods in the literature) uses a proxy approach to deal with
endogenous factors of production. However, as discussed in Foster et al. (2008), these proxy methods
are less suitable for speci￿cations with both demand shocks and productivity shocks (there is an omitted
variable problem in the proxy inversion). Nonetheless, we generated TFP measures using proxy methods
and also ￿nd that the resulting TFP measures are highly correlated with our TFP measure estimated
using instrumental variables.
21One possible concern in interpreting this inverse correlation between TFP and prices is division
bias. TFP is physical output per unit input but physical output is based on the ratio of nominal output
to plant-level prices. If there is measurement error in prices this can yield an inverse correlation in TFP
and prices. To explore the relevance of this concern, we also have estimated the correlation between
lagged TFP and current prices. If measurement error in plant-level prices is white noise then this
15and demand shocks in the next section. This ￿nding is also useful to provide insights
as to the underlying sources and interpretations of price variation. As noted, price
dispersion is consistent with product di⁄erentiation. This product di⁄erentiation may
re￿ ect horizontal or vertical di⁄erentiation. As such, some of the price variation may
re￿ ect product quality variation. While it is obviously of interest to ultimately sort out
the nature of this product di⁄erentiation, this is not the focus of the current analysis.
However, we note that the inverse correlation between TFP and prices is consistent
with more e¢ cient producers moving along downward sloping demand curves.22 For our
purposes, then, if plant-level prices in part re￿ ect variation in product quality (as well
as potentially other sources of idiosyncratic demand shocks), our underlying assumption
is that such variation in product quality is not correlated with TFP so that TFP serves
as a good instrument for the output price in the demand function.23
Table 2 also illustrates the importance of being able to measure plant-level prices
and physical e¢ ciency. TFP2 is a measure of ￿revenue￿productivity, similar to that
used more frequently in the literature, given the absence of plant-level prices. Similar
to the other measures of productivity we have reported, it is calculated using equation
(1), but where Yjt is plant-level output divided by sectoral-level price indices and Mjt
is expenditures on materials divided by sectoral-level materials price indices. Although
TFP and TFP2 are positively related, the correlation coe¢ cient is only 0.68, signi￿cantly
below the correlation of TFP with both TFPC and TFPO, where the latter all use plant
level prices. Moreover, TFP2 is essentially uncorrelated with plant-level prices. Indeed,
the relation between prices and productivity, which we exploit in our data to identify
demand elasticities and shocks, disappears when sector-level de￿ ators are used. The
reason for this is straightforward: variation in TFP2 directly re￿ ects the variation in
prices, and the resulting positive correlation with plant-level prices o⁄sets the negative
correlation between prices and physical productivity (TFP).
4.2.2 Demand Estimation
While productivity is likely to be one of the crucial components of pro￿tability, as
discussed in Section 2, other components are also probably important determinants of
eliminates the division bias. The average within sector correlation of lagged TFP and current prices is
-0.59 which is similar in magnitude to the -0.65 correlation between TFP and prices in Table 2.
22We ￿nd that this inverse correlation holds for all 3-digit sectors.
23If productivity shocks and product quality were positively related, we would be more likely to
observe a positive correlation between TFP and prices.
16pro￿tability and survival. For example, even if plants are highly productive, they may
be forced to exit the market if faced with large negative idiosyncratic demand shocks.
Another important determinant of exits is likely to be the degree of market power of
a producer, which empirically can be captured by the mark-up or the inverse of the
demand elasticity. In this section, we describe how we estimate both the demand shocks
as well as demand elasticities.
Our demand shock measure is estimated as the residual from estimating a demand
equation, which in its simplest form may be written (in logs) as:
logYjt = "j logPjt + logDjt:
In this case, the demand shock is estimated using the following expression:
djt = log c Djt = logYjt +b "j logPjt; (2)
where djt is the demand shock faced by ￿rm j at time t and b "j is the estimated elasticity
of demand, which may potentially vary across plants or sectors and which is strictly
negative in the presence of a downward sloping demand.
Using OLS to estimate the demand function is likely to generate an upwardly biased
estimate of demand elasticities because demand shocks are positively correlated to both
output and prices, so thatb " will be smaller in absolute value than the true ": To eliminate
the upward bias in our estimates of demand elasticities, we use TFP as an instrument
for Pjt since TFP is negatively correlated with prices but unlikely to be correlated
with demand shocks (Eslava et al. (2004)).24 Also, to avoid potential problems from
measurement error and associated division bias, we use lagged TFP as the instrument.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the OLS and IV results from the simple demand
equation. For consistency with other estimations reported below, the estimation is done
pooling establishments from all sectors and controlling for sector e⁄ects at the 2-digit
24In the macro literature on TFP there is considerable attention paid to measured cyclical ￿ uctuations
in TFP being associated with unmeasured changes in factor utilization (see, e.g., Basu and Fernald
(2000)). As such, at the aggregate level, the assumption of measured TFP and aggregate demand
shocks being uncorrelated may be problematic. However, we are mostly exploiting cross sectional
variation in plant-level TFP with the variance of idiosyncratic shocks an order of magnitude larger
than any aggregate shocks. Moreover, the idiosyncratic TFP and demand shocks we estimate are
highly persistent suggesting that issues about cyclical factor utilization are dwarfed by the highly
persistent idiosyncratic shocks (thus, inducing relatively little idiosyncratic variation in unmeasured
factor utilization). Also, to the extent that energy usage proxies for capacity utilization, we would be
taking the utilization factor out of our TFP measure.
17level. We control for sector e⁄ects to control for unobserved sectoral heterogeneity and
we estimate robust standard errors.25 OLS results presented in Column (1) yield an
estimated elasticity of -0.87. Meanwhile, IV results in Column (2), which use (lagged)
TFP as an instrument, show a much higher average elasticity (in absolute value) of -2.12.
We also estimate a di⁄erent demand speci￿cation, in which we let the demand elas-
ticity vary over time and by a plant￿ s location. To do this, we include the density of
roads in the state in which the plant is located both as a control and as an interaction
variable in the demand speci￿cation. The idea behind including density of roads is that
this is a good proxy for access to markets, so that we should expect demand to increase
as the density of roads increases and also competition to increase as access to markets
improves. In this case, the demand equation may be written as,
logYjt = ￿0+￿1 logPjt+￿2DensityR(j)t+￿3DensityR(j)t￿logPjt+ S(j)+￿R(j)+logDjt;
where DensityR(j)t is measured in kilometers of paved roads per square kilometer of total
area of the state R(j) in which plant j is located,  S(j) are 2-digit sector e⁄ects and
￿R(j) are region (state) e⁄ects.26 The latter control for unobserved sectoral and regional
heterogeneity. In particular, region ￿xed e⁄ects are added to control for unobserved
factors at the region level that may drive demand as well as be correlated with road
density. As in the previous case, we estimate robust standard errors. We also include
national level GDP growth as an additional control, to make sure that the variation of
roads over time is not simply re￿ ecting other aggregate e⁄ects. In this case, the demand
shock is again estimated as the components of demand after abstracting from the impact
of price, while the demand elasticity may be written as:
b "R(j)t = ￿1 + ￿3DensityR(j)t: (3)
Column (3) of Table 3 reports results for this speci￿cation. As expected, we ￿nd that
increased road density increases the demand for output. Also, increased road density
25Wooldridge (2002) notes that in models with unobserved heterogeneity at the group level assump-
tions need to be made about the form of this heterogeneity. One could assume that the unobserved
heterogeneity is not correlated with the RHS variables and then use random e⁄ect estimators and/or
clustered standard error corrections as appropriate. He notes that permitting ￿xed e⁄ects that are
potentially correlated with RHS variables is more robust than these alternatives but also notes that
robust standard error estimators are required. It is this latter approach that we use throughout this
analysis.
26The density measure varies across states and over di⁄erent decades (1980s and 1990s). The data
were provided by CEDE.
18increases the demand elasticity (in absolute terms), consistent with the idea that greater
competition due to greater access to markets makes demand more responsive to changes
in prices.27
In what follows, we use the estimates of demand shocks and elasticities from Table
3 in our analysis of the impact of market fundamentals on plant exit. As will become
clear, we explore analyses using the estimates from both Columns (2) and (3) of Table
3.
5 E⁄ects of Market Fundamentals and Tari⁄s on
Plant Exit
5.1 The Role of Market Fundamentals for Selection
As discussed in Section 2, the characterization of the exit decision implies that the plant
ceases operations if its net present discounted value of pro￿ts (inclusive of ￿xed costs
of operating) is negative. Assuming that the ￿xed cost, ujt, is drawn from a normal
distribution, we can in practice estimate a plant￿ s probability of exit using a probit
model, where we specify the probability of exit between t and t + 1 as a function of
measures of market fundamentals in period t ￿ 1:28
Pr(ejS(j)R(j)t) = Pr(￿S +￿GGDPt +￿1TFPjt￿1 +P
0
Ijt￿1￿2 +￿3Djt￿1 +￿4"R(j)t￿1 ￿ ujt);
(4)
where ejs(j)R(j)t takes the value of 1 if the plant j in sector S(j) and region R(j) exits
between periods t and t + 1; ￿S are 2-digit industry e⁄ects; GDPt is the growth of
27It would be interesting to explore demand structures that permit richer variation in plant-level
mark-ups. Another idea suggested to us by Chad Syverson would be to use our data to compute plant-
speci￿c mark-ups directly. That is, use our plant-speci￿c cost data to estimate marginal costs and then
compute mark-ups at the plant-level. Investigating the properties of such mark-ups including how they
vary across di⁄erent types of plants and how they may have changed in response to market reforms is
an interesting empirical agenda that we plan to pursue in future related work.
28To justify a probit we require that there be some unobserved heterogeneity beyond the fundamentals
that we measure to account for the variation in the data on plant exit. One obvious candidate is
variation in the ￿xed cost of operating each period. Alternatively, there could be some other component
of operating pro￿ts that is unobserved but uncorrelated with the fundamentals that we do observe. For
ease of exposition, we refer to this stochastic unobserved heterogeneity as a stochastic ￿xed cost in the
text.
19aggregate gross domestic product in year t; TFPjt￿1 measures productivity in period
t￿1, PIjt￿1 is a vector of energy and materials prices in period t￿1; Djt￿1 is a demand
shifter in period t￿1; "R(j)t￿1 is the price elasticity of demand for plant j in region R(j)
in period t ￿ 1, and ujt is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term. In what follows, we
consider alternative speci￿cations of this basic equation using the alternative measures
of market fundamentals that we have developed in the analysis above.29
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the determinants of exit included in equation
(4) (except for input prices which are reported in Table 1), as well as for e⁄ective tari⁄s
and indices of other reforms, which will be included in an expanded speci￿cation. The
sample has been limited to the observations that enter those estimations. Since the
index of other reforms is only available since 1985, our estimation period for the exit
equations is 1985-1998.
Table 5 reports the marginal e⁄ects obtained from estimating the baseline speci￿-
cation in equation (4), as well as speci￿cations with additional more controls in each
subsequent column. In all the speci￿cations in Table 5, we include 2-digit sector ￿xed
e⁄ects to control for unobserved sectoral heterogeneity and we estimate robust standard
errors. Marginal e⁄ects are calculated setting all right-hand-side variables at their mean
levels. Column (1) reports the e⁄ect of productivity and input prices on plant exit when
2-digit sector ￿xed e⁄ects and aggregate GDP growth are included, but idiosyncratic
demand e⁄ects are left out. As expected, higher lagged productivity is negatively related
to the probability of exit, while higher lagged energy and material prices are positively
related with the probability of leaving the market. In particular, a one standard devi-
ation increase in TFP from its mean level yields a 1.1 percentage point decrease in the
probability of exit, and one standard deviation increase in energy and material prices
yield respective increases of 0.35 and 0.6 percentage points in the probability of exit.30
Since the average exit probability is 9%, these e⁄ects, especially the one associated with
29We use fundamentals dated at time t ￿ 1 to predict exit from t to t + 1 given possible incomplete
measurement and endogeneity issues in period t (the period just prior to exit). Our data are calendar
year data but there may be mid-year exits which may yield measurement error in fundamentals for part
year plants. Moreover, if the process of exit itself as the plant shuts down impacts fundamentals there
is a problem of reverse causality. The use of period t ￿ 1 information mitigates both of these concerns.
30Note that because our exit model is not linear and because one standard deviation changes in the
fundamentals are not marginal changes, these e⁄ects cannot be simply obtained by multiplying the
change in the fundamental by its marginal e⁄ect. We obtain them by evaluating the probability of exit
when one fundamental is one standard deviation away from its mean and the others are at their means,
and calculating the di⁄erence between that probability and the probability of exit when all regressors
are at their means.
20TFP, re￿ ect large percentage changes in the probability of exit.
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 5 report results including idiosyncratic demand e⁄ects.
Column (2) includes the output price as a rough control for demand, while Columns (3)
and (4) include our measures of demand shifts and elasticities. The results in Column
(3) use the demand shocks from Column (2) of Table 3 ￿this is the relevant speci￿cation
when we do not permit elasticities to vary across plants. For this speci￿cation, we ￿nd
that a one standard deviation increase in TFP and demand yields respective reductions of
1.2 and 3.1 percentage points in the probability of exit, while a one standard deviation
increase in energy and material prices yield a 0.4 and 0.8 percentage points increase,
respectively, in the probability of exit.31
When we permit elastiticies to vary across plants consistent with Column (3) of Table
3 (where elasticities vary with road density), a one standard deviation demand shock
yields a 3 percentage points reduction in the probability of exit. A one standard deviation
increase in the price elasticity reduces the probability of exit by 0.28 percentage points.
Since the price elasticity of demand is strictly negative, a larger demand elasticity (i.e.,
closer to zero) is associated with more inelastic demand, so that more market power
reduces exit. The e⁄ects of TFP and input prices are very similar in Columns (3) and
(4).
To help put the results in this section into perspective, we note that many empirical
papers on market selection include controls for plant size and age and ￿nd that younger
and smaller plants are more likely to exit. In our view, these variables are typically
included to proxy for unobserved market fundamentals. In our case, we have a very
rich set of fundamentals that are motivated by the theory. For example, our demand
shock measure captures variation in scale not driven by variation in productivity, and
thus we do not include size as a control. Put di⁄erently, our scale measure emerges
directly from the theory while typical measures of size (e.g., total number of employees)
are endogenous and functions of the market fundamentals that we have measured. We
note, however, that a case could be made for inclusion of an endogenous state variable
related to size ￿namely the capital stock. As a robustness check, we estimated similar
speci￿cations to those in Table 5 but also including the lagged capital stock and found
that these results are robust to inclusion of this variable. Moreover, we found that
31We report results with the output price included directly into the exit equation in Column (2)
to show that the e⁄ect of the demand shock is similar whether we disaggregate the mark-up and
idiosyncratic demand or whether we take a rougher measure. To the extent that there are any concerns
about being able to separate the demand shock and elasticities, it is reassuring to note that the results
in Column (2) and those in Columns (3) and (4) are similar.
21plants with a bigger capital stock are associated with a lower probability of exit. We do
not include capital either in the baseline speci￿cation when we examine the interaction
with tari⁄s, to keep the focus on market fundamentals. However, in unreported results
available upon request, we ￿nd that subsequent analysis to also be robust to the inclusion
of capital.32
Finally, we note that while we have a very rich set of fundamentals that capture a
great deal of variation across plants, it is possible that some unobserved heterogeneity
in the fundamentals underlying current and future expected pro￿tability remains. This
might mean, for example, that estimated e⁄ects of the observed cost variables are also
capturing the e⁄ects of unobserved cost factors that are correlated with the observed
measures. For many of the purposes of this paper, this is not a critical concern since we
would still interpret our results as providing insights into the role of market fundamentals
for market selection. However, as exploratory analysis and as a robustness check we
estimated the speci￿cations in Table 5 as linear probability models with establishment
￿xed e⁄ects.33 Interestingly, we ￿nd that our results are robust to this speci￿cation.
In fact, we ￿nd that the marginal e⁄ects of TFP, energy prices, demand and market
power become larger when plant e⁄ects are included. We found this robustness check
reassuring but regard our baseline speci￿cation as being more closely tied to the theory
where plants receive draws from the distribution of market fundamentals with plant-level
persistence in these draws.
5.2 The Interaction of Tari⁄s and Market Fundamentals for
Selection
In order to assess the impact of trade reform on market selection, we add the sectoral
tari⁄s as well as interactions of these with market fundamentals to the baseline pro-
bit speci￿cation. We also include an index for other contemporaneous reforms which
occurred at the same time as the trade reform. This index summarizes the degree of
￿ exibility in the areas of labor and capital market regulations as well as the extent of
32As an additional unrelated robustness check, we also explored whether our results in Table 5 are
robust to the exclusion of the plant-year observations in 1991-92. Given changes in processing of the
longitudinal identi￿ers in the plant-level data in those years, these are years for which we had to devote
considerable e⁄ort to develop consistent longitudinal identi￿ers. We found that the results are robust
to the exclusion of these years.
33With this large a sample, estimation of linear probability models yields similar results to probit
models, although with potential problems of interpretation.
22market orientation in terms of the tax system and privatization. Since the 1990s were
characterized by the introduction of widespread reforms in all of these areas, it is im-
portant to control for other reforms to make sure that tari⁄s are not picking up these
additional institutional changes. The following equation is estimated:
Pr(ejS(j)R(j)t) = Pr(￿S + ￿GGDPt + ￿1TFPjt￿1 + P
0
Ijt￿1￿2 + ￿3Djt￿1 + ￿4"R(j)t￿1
+ ￿5￿S(j)t + ￿5;1TFPjt￿1 ￿ ￿S(j)t + (PIjt￿1 ￿ ￿S(j)t)
0￿5;2
+￿5;3Djt￿1 ￿ ￿S(j)t + ￿5;4"R(j)t￿1 ￿ ￿S(j)t
+￿6Rt + ￿6;1TFPjt￿1 ￿ Rt + (PIjt￿1 ￿ Rt)
0￿6;2
+ ￿6;3Djt￿1 ￿ Rt + ￿6;4"R(j)t￿1 ￿ Rt ￿ ujt)
(5)
where ejS(j)R(j)t, ￿S, GDPt, TFPjt￿1, PIjt￿1, Djt￿1, and "R(j)t are de￿ned as in equation
(4). ￿S(j)t is the tari⁄ in sector S(j) in year t, and Rt stands for the index of reforms
other than trade at time t. We regard this ￿ exible speci￿cation with interactions as
consistent with the canonical model of plant exit discussed in Section 2. In particular,
this speci￿cation permits us to test and explore our primary hypothesis ￿that is, that
plants in sectors with a greater reduction in tari⁄s will exhibit a decline in market
distortions and, in turn, the marginal e⁄ect of market fundamentals on exit will increase.
The interaction e⁄ects in the above speci￿cation are included to test this hypothesis.
We control for GDP growth rather than time e⁄ects since much of the variability of
tari⁄s we want to exploit, in particular the general pattern of trade liberalization, occurs
over time.34 We consider alternative versions of this interacted speci￿cation using the
alternative measures of market fundamentals developed in prior sections.
Given the presence of interaction terms, note that, for example, the marginal e⁄ect






jt￿)[￿1 + ￿5;1￿S(j)t + ￿6;1Rt] (6)
where F 0 is the marginal density for the normal distribution, and X
0
jt￿ summarizes all
covariates and coe¢ cients in (5). A similar expression applies for the marginal e⁄ects of
34As a robustness check, we also estimated similar regressions where GDP growth is replaced with
time e⁄ects. As in our baseline case, we still ￿nd enhanced market selection after trade liberalization, as
productivity becomes a more important determinant of exit at lower levels of tari⁄s. The fact that this
e⁄ect is present when including time dummies probably indicates that the cross-sectional variability of
tari⁄s is what matters for market selection. The other e⁄ects of tari⁄s on the determinants of exit show
similar qualitative e⁄ects when including time dummies, although the changes of these e⁄ects induced
by the trade reform are estimated less precisely.
23other fundamentals.
Table 6 reports results of speci￿cations that include interaction terms as in equa-
tion (5). Table 6 presents two alternative versions of the estimation. The ￿rst three
columns are based on the fundamentals that emerge when demand elasticities do not
vary across plants while the second three columns use the fundamentals that emerge
when demand elasticities vary by road density. Each row reports the marginal e⁄ect for
the corresponding variable, following the example of equation (6). Marginal e⁄ects are
calculated at the mean value for all variables, except for tari⁄s, which are allowed to
vary across columns. In Columns (1) and (4) tari⁄s are set at 60%, and in Columns (2)
and (5) they are set at 20%. Since the mean value of tari⁄s is 56%, the e⁄ects reported
in Columns (1) and (4) are close to what is obtained by setting tari⁄s at their mean val-
ues. These marginal e⁄ects are based on the estimation of equation (5), which includes
interaction of all fundamentals with both e⁄ective tari⁄s and the index of reforms other
than trade. Columns (3) and (6) of Table 6 report the di⁄erence between the e⁄ects in
Columns (1) and (2) and in Columns (4) and (5), respectively. Consequently, Columns
(3) and (6) show changes in the marginal e⁄ects of each fundamental when tari⁄s fall
from 60% to 20%; in this way, we focus in a discrete change in tari⁄s such as the one
that took place in Colombia.35
Results from Column (1) show that the e⁄ects of fundamentals are in general consis-
tent with those estimated with the more parsimonious model reported in Table 5. The
only exception is that the marginal e⁄ect of energy prices is not statistically signi￿cant.
Results on the e⁄ects of a reduction in e⁄ective tari⁄s from 60% to 20% reported in
Column (3) show that a reduction in tari⁄s increases the impacts of plant productivity,
input prices, and demand shocks on the exit probability. In particular, the marginal
e⁄ect of an increase in productivity on the probability of exit is -1.5 percentage points if
tari⁄s are at 60%, and -2.0 points if tari⁄s are at 20%. The marginal e⁄ect of an increase
in demand shocks is to reduce the probability that a plant exits by 2.2 percentage points
if tari⁄s are at 60%, and by 2.4 percentage points if tari⁄s are at 20%. Similarly, the
marginal e⁄ect of an increase in material prices goes from 1.9 to 2.8 percentage points.
The estimated e⁄ect of a change in energy prices more than doubles when moving from
60% to 20% tari⁄s, and while each individual e⁄ect is insigni￿cant their di⁄erence is
signi￿cant at the 10% level. As mentioned before, the average exit rate is 9%, so that
35Given the large changes in tari⁄s we are evaluating, we follow this approach rather than calculating
the cross derivative of the probability of exit with respect to the fundamental and to tari⁄s, as suggested
by Ai and Norton (2003).
24these predicted e⁄ects are large relative to the average exit probability.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 6 show results when the market fundamentals for demand
are drawn from the speci￿cation that permits the demand elasticity to vary across plants.
This permits exploring the interaction of tari⁄reductions with both demand shocks and
demand elasticities. The results for TFP and input prices are almost the same as those
in Columns (1)-(3), so we focus our remarks on the impact of the demand shocks and
demand elasticity. While we obtain about the same results for the demand shock in this
speci￿cation, the estimated impact of the tari⁄ change moves from being marginally
signi￿cant to marginally insigni￿cant. Yet, the results for the demand elasticity are
insigni￿cant in this interacted speci￿cation. Our interpretation is that this interacted
speci￿cation pushes the data too hard in requiring a lot of variation in the regressors,
and our demand elasticity variation is limited. For the other market fundamentals
like TFP, input prices, and demand shocks, our estimation methodology yields large
and idiosyncratic variation in the fundamentals across plants. In contrast, the demand
elasticity varies across plants based upon the road density of the region. We think the
latter makes sense and yields interesting patterns in Tables 3 and 5 but likely yields
insu¢ cient variation in the estimated elasticity across plants to identify the interaction
e⁄ect of interest.36
In what follows, we conduct a series of counterfactual exercises to illustrate the
quantitative implications of Table 6. For this purpose, we use the results from Columns
(1)-(3). As noted, both the speci￿cations with and without the demand elasticity in
Table 6 yield a clear picture of the interaction between the change in fundamentals and
the change in tari⁄s for TFP, which is the primary focus of the remainder of the analysis.
Similarly, the speci￿cations with and without the demand elasticity show essentially the
same results for productivity and input prices. In addition, both panels yield similar
patterns for demand shocks but with greater precision when the elasticity is left out.
As a summary measure of the overall impact of these interaction e⁄ects, we conducted
the following counterfactual. Using the estimated probability of exit speci￿cation, we
compare the plant-level predicted probability of exit when tari⁄s take on their actual
values in each year to the predicted probability of exit when we ￿x tari⁄s at their
highest levels, i.e., their 1984 levels (all other explanatory variables are held at their
mean values under both scenarios). Figure 2 shows this comparison and indicates that
the mean predicted probability of exit would had been higher every year with the actual
36An important area for future work should be to develop richer demand structures that permit
quantifying the variation in demand elastities in a more precise manner across plants.
25tari⁄s than if tari⁄s had stayed at their 1984 levels, with the di⁄erence (the dotted line)
being particularly acute during the 1990s. The di⁄erence between these two predictions
is in the 0.6 to 1 percentage point range during the 1990s ￿again a large e⁄ect relative
to the average exit rate of 9%. Note as well that this counterfactual is static in the
sense that the t-1 market fundamentals are used to predict exit in period t, and likely
understates the e⁄ect of reform by not looking at the cumulative e⁄ects of reform. By
contrast, below we undertake a dynamic counterfactual simulation which accounts for
the cumulative e⁄ects.
Before proceeding to the implications of the dynamic analysis for aggregate produc-
tivity in the next section, it is useful to note that we conducted a number of robustness
checks of the results in Tables 5 and 6.37 One possible concern is that the variation in
tari⁄reductions across sectors is endogenous. To address this possibility, we constructed
sectoral Her￿ndahl indices and dropped the 20% most concentrated 4-digit sectors in
our sample according to this index. We do this to dispel concerns that, even though
tari⁄s are measured at the sector- rather than the plant-level, in very concentrated sec-
tors individual establishments could had in￿ uenced the tari⁄ rate in the sector. The
results are remarkably similar to those that include even the most concentrated sectors
in the sample. In addition, it is important to point out that the correlation between the
Her￿ndhal index and tari⁄s is -0.05 and insigni￿cant. If the lobbying story was behind
the higher tari⁄s in a sector, we would expect the correlation between the Her￿ndhal
Index and tari⁄s to be positive and signi￿cant. In addition, we checked the robustness
of our results to alternative measures of tari⁄s. As an alternative, we substituted the
main e⁄ect and interactions terms of e⁄ective tari⁄s for nominal tari⁄s and the results
are in general very similar. The exception is the change in the marginal e⁄ect of demand
shocks induced by the trade liberalization, which lacks statistical signi￿cance when using
nominal tari⁄s.38
In addition, we explored concerns about biases in the estimation of shocks and de-
mand elasticities due the possibility that product quality and TFP move together. First,
we estimated the correlation between TFP and relative prices and dropped the 4-digit
sectors with the top 20% correlations (i.e. those exhibiting less negative correlations)
which may be presumably the sectors where TFP and product quality move together.
37The results are not shown but are available upon request.
38We prefer the e⁄ective tari⁄s measure because it captures the total e⁄ect of trade liberalization
including the e⁄ect of competition in the output market as well as increased access to input markets,
while nominal tari⁄s only capture the ￿rst e⁄ect.
26The e⁄ects of all fundamentals on exit remain similar in size and signi￿cance in this
version of the estimation; some of the changes in those e⁄ects induced by trade lib-
eralization are estimated less precisely, probably due the smaller sample ￿ close to 1/4
of our observations are lost in this robustness check. Second, to address the potential
biases in the estimation of demand shocks and elasticities, we estimate the interacted
model (5), but leaving out the level and interaction e⁄ects of the demand shocks and
elasticities and including instead level and interaction e⁄ects of the output price. The
results are similar though, not surprisingly, less precise since, as noted in Table 2, TFP
and output prices are strongly negatively correlated. Finally, we explored whether the
impact of trade reforms takes time to have an impact by including the change in tari⁄s
(in addition to the tari⁄ level) in the speci￿cation. We found that the results reported
in Table 6 are robust to inclusion of the change of tari⁄s as an additional explanatory
variable and the latter was by itself not signi￿cant.
Finally, it is natural to ask whether our analysis sheds light on the impact of other
reforms. The speci￿cation that underlies the analysis in Table 6 includes other reforms
and the interaction of other reforms with market fundamentals so that we can, in princi-
ple, conduct an analysis of other reforms in an analogous fashion. We have explored this
possibility in unreported results by quantifying the interactions of other reforms with
market fundamentals. In this analysis, we ￿nd little systematic impact of other reforms
in terms of their interaction with market fundamentals. We note, however, caution in
interpreting these ￿ndings since the other reform measure only varies over time. As
such, and quite di⁄erent from our analysis of trade reform, we are not able to exploit
variation in reforms across both sectors and time. Put di⁄erently, our primary motiva-
tion for including the other reforms variables in the speci￿cation underlying Table 6 is
to include controls for the overall time series changes in market reform. In that respect,
we can interpret the results in Table 6 and the subsequent analysis as holding those time
series patterns constant.
6 E⁄ects of Tari⁄s on Average Productivity
In this section we explore various channels through which tari⁄s and increased foreign
competition may have a⁄ected average productivity in the manufacturing sector. Given
our focus in this paper on plant exit and market selection, we ￿rst investigate the impli-
cations of our ￿ndings on improved market selection for average productivity. However,
to put our ￿ndings into perspective given other channels and other ￿ndings in the liter-
27ature, we also explore whether greater international competition increased productivity
by changing the behavior of incumbent establishments. First, trade liberalization may
yield within plant increases in productivity through a variety of e⁄ects including incen-
tives to invest in technology in response to increased competition and greater exposure
to the world production technology frontier. Second, reduced distortions can lead to
an improvement in the overall allocation of activity. That is, increased competition is
likely to move production from low towards high productivity plants, strengthening the
correlation between market share and plant-level productivity. As we have noted in the
introduction, there are a number of papers that have explored such channels (includ-
ing, Baggs (2005), Tre￿ er (2004), Pavcnik (2002), Head and Ries (1999), and Gibson
and Harris (1996)). Our value added here is that we use this exploration of alternative
channels to help put our results on market selection into perspective. In addition, our
results are the ￿rst to use measures of plant-level physical productivity in this context
and one of the few papers to use tari⁄ measures at a ￿ne level of disaggregation.39
6.1 Trade Induced Exits and Productivity
The analysis on exits above suggests that trade reform made productivity (and other
market fundamentals) more important in determining which plants remain in operation.
These results imply that greater competition due to trade liberalization is weeding out
the least productive plants and keeping the most productive plants in operation. Thus,
one may expect market selection to contribute to increased average productivity. This
contribution is likely cumulative since weeding out low productivity plants in a given year
implies that market selection in subsequent years will be based on an already improved
and select sample of plants.
39Beyond the channels we explore there are a number of additional channels in the literature whereby
trade liberalization impacts plant performance through the availability of new inputs, either novel
varieties or higher quality. Recent evidence shows that trade liberalization in India generated gains
through the expansion of product and input varieties. Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova
(2009) document this on the input side, and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2008) on
the output side. Also, Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) present evidence consistent with higher quality
of imported inputs, bene￿cial for higher productivity manufacturers. At the same time, Amiti and
Konings (2007) ￿nd evidence that the more intensive use of imported inputs due to trade liberalization
is associated with higher productivity among manufacturers in Indonesia; and Halpern, Koren and
Szeidl (2005) provide similar evidence for Hungary. While our paper does not analyze these channels
directly, our use of e⁄ective, rather than nominal, tari⁄s takes into account improved access to imported
inputs.
28In this section, we investigate the possible contribution of trade reforms to average
plant-level productivity via a selection e⁄ect. Focusing on the selection e⁄ect alone, we
generate an estimate of average plant-level productivity under two alternative selection
scenarios. Under one scenario, we use the actual values of tari⁄s to predict exit using our
estimated selection model, and estimate the implied path of average productivity. Under
the second scenario, we set tari⁄s at their 1984 value and then generate the dynamic
path of selection that would have occurred from 1985 onwards.40 Since productivity,
demand and input cost shocks were also changing during the period, we carry out a
dynamic simulation of the exit process of Colombian plants that allows us to hold the
contribution of changes in the shock processes constant.
Our dynamic simulation works as follows. First, we take the set of plants in 1985
with their actual values of fundamentals. We use the estimated probit model in (5)
to generate a predicted set of exiters and survivors for 1986. Note that 1985 is the
￿rst year for which we have all the determinants of exit included in equation (5), which
is why we use 1985 to initialize our simulation. In generating the predicted exiters
and survivors, we assign all plants at risk a value of 0 (exit) or 1 (survive) by taking
appropriate random draws from a binary distribution with the estimated probability
of exit. Under one scenario the tari⁄s are set at the 1985 (true) values and under the
other scenario the tari⁄s are set at the 1984 values. For the establishments that are
predicted to survive, we then generate the 1986 fundamentals using AR(1) processes
estimated for each fundamental (i.e., TFP, demand shocks, cost shocks) using the entire
sample of plants.41 We then add, to that set of plants, the actual 1986 entrants with
their actual value of fundamentals. Next, we repeat the simulation of exit and survival
￿again using, alternatively, the 1986 (true) tari⁄s and the 1984 tari⁄s. We continue this
process iteratively for all plants, allowing us to generate two counterfactual distributions
of plants up to 1998.
Using these two counterfactual distributions of plants, we calculate key moments of
the distribution of TFP. In particular, we calculate the path of average productivity
for each year for the two dynamic simulations. We note that since the shock processes
for fundamentals are being held constant in these dynamic simulations, any di⁄erence
in average TFP between the two scenarios responds to di⁄erences in the exit process
40The 1984 tari⁄s were the highest tari⁄s observed during our entire sample period.
41The AR(1) processes assume a mean-zero normally distributed error. Our projections based on
these processes include a random draw of a mean zero normal distribution, with the standard deviation
of the residuals from the AR(1) estimation for each of the fundamentals.
29associated with the alternative trade policies.
Our results are reported in Table 7. Column (1) reports the means and standard
deviations of the log of TFP when the exit process assumes that tari⁄s are at their actual
levels for each 4-digit industry for the entire sample of plants. Column (2) reports
the mean for the case in which exit is projected keeping tari⁄s at their 1984 values.
Finally, Column (3) reports the di⁄erence between these two columns and t-statistics
for these mean di⁄erences in square brackets. We conduct these simulations for all years
as described above. In reporting the results, we ￿nd it instructive to report results
for pooled years so that we compare and contrast the period when tari⁄s remained
relatively high, 1986-1991, to the period during which tari⁄s were substantially reduced,
1992-1998. Our results indicate that the change in tari⁄s from the initial 1984 level
generate insigni￿cant gains in average TFP between 1986 and 1991. By contrast, the
results show a large gain in average TFP between 1992 and 1998 of 3.3 log points
which is signi￿cant at the 1% level for the entire sample of plants. As a separate, but
closely related experiment, we repeat these dynamic simulations but exclude the entrants
from the analysis to explore the extent to which the di⁄erences in selection across the
two scenarios yields di⁄erences for the 1985 incumbents only and also changes in entry
selectivity. The results in Columns (4)-(6) of Table 7 show smaller gains in TFP from
the reduction in tari⁄s relative to the 1984 level when the simulation is carried out for
the 1985 incumbents alone. This suggests that better market selection of recent entrants
after tari⁄s go down is an important channel through which trade has a positive impact
on productivity.
Table 8 shows that this change in average TFP is, indeed, driven partly by the
weeding out of less e¢ cient plants. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 8 report the mean,
standard deviation, and the 1st and 50th percentiles of the simulated TFP in 1998 for the
sample of plants predicted to survive up to that year given the actual and 1984 tari⁄s,
respectively. The simulated TFP for plants in the lowest percentile of simulated TFP
has a cut point 8 log points higher when choosing the plants predicted to survive with
actual tari⁄s compared to when the 1984 tari⁄s are used, consistent with lower tari⁄s
increasing productivity at the lower end of the distribution. While we also observe
higher productivity at the median when choosing the plants predicted to survive with
actual instead of the 1984 tari⁄ levels, the di⁄erence is much smaller than for the ￿rst
percentile (less than half a log point).
To put the results in Tables 7 and 8 into perspective, we note that over the 1992
to 1998 period the average industry in Colombia experienced an increase in total factor
30productivity of 12 log points (Eslava et al. (2004)). From that perspective, increases
in average productivity of 3% from a change in the market selection process driven by
trade reform alone are substantial.
6.2 E⁄ects of Trade on Reallocation and Productivity Growth
of Incumbents
While the focus in our paper has been on the impact of trade on plant exits and, in
turn, on productivity, we are also interested in examining the impact of reduced tari⁄s
on the productivity of continuing establishments.
First, continuing plants may be induced to become more productive through in-
creased international competition and greater exposure to best practices world-wide.
To examine this hypothesis, we estimate a simple di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences speci￿cation
regressing the log ￿rst di⁄erence of TFP for continuing plants on year e⁄ects, detailed
industry e⁄ects and the change in tari⁄s (at the 4-digit level). This speci￿cation is anal-
ogous to a similar exercise in Pavcnik (2002). Results are presented in Panel 1 of Table
9. We ￿nd evidence that continuing plants in industries with larger tari⁄ reductions
have greater within plant growth rates in productivity. The point estimate suggests
that reducing tari⁄s from 60 to 20 percent (approximately the average size of the tari⁄
reduction) would yield a within plant increase in productivity of about 2.8 log points.
This within plant e⁄ect is smaller than the increase in average plant productivity we
estimated from selection. Put together with the results in the prior section, the trade
reforms appear to increase average plant-level productivity both by cutting o⁄the lower
tail of the productivity distribution and by increasing productivity among continuing
plants.
Second, trade reform may have improved the overall allocation of activity.42 We
examine the impact of trade opening on the reallocation of activity by conducting both
plant-level and sectoral-level analyses. Both of these analyses should be interpreted as
providing insights into how the level of tari⁄s impacts the correlation between market
share and productivity. At the plant-level, we regress the share of the plant￿ s output in
its 3-digit sector on productivity, tari⁄s and the interaction of tari⁄s and productivity
42While the shedding of less productive plants may be one reason for an improvement of the allocation
of activity, more dynamic internal adjustments for incumbent plants and entry of establishments that
are more productive or quickly become more productive may also work in the same direction. In this
sense, the analysis of the size-productivity correlation after reform conducted in this section is broader
than the analysis of plant exit above.
31while also controlling for sector and year e⁄ects. The results reported in Panel 2 of
Table 9 show that lower tari⁄s increase the correlation between plant-level productivity
and market share, i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interaction term of tari⁄s and productivity
is negative. The point estimates imply that a reducing tari⁄s from 60 to 20 percent
increases the correlation from 0.30 to 0.36.
Similarly, we can use the Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) sectoral decomposition method-
ology to compute the covariance between market share and plant-level productivity for
every 3-digit sector in each year. We then estimate a simple di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences
speci￿cation with the dependent variable being the 3-digit yearly OP cross-term and the
explanatory variables including industry e⁄ects, year e⁄ects and 3-digit tari⁄s. Column
(2) of Panel 3 of Table 9 shows that sectors with lower tari⁄s experience a larger increase
in the OP cross-term. The point estimate suggests that reducing tari⁄s from 60 to 20
percent increases the OP cross-term by 7.8 log points. This improved allocation is a large
e⁄ect relative to either the within plant increases for continuing plants and the market
selection e⁄ects discussed above. Note however that this reallocation e⁄ect is partly
driven by the market selection e⁄ects we discuss above. That is, more productive plants
may increase their market share not only at the expense of less productive continuing
plants but also at the expense of less productive plants which exited the market.
Finally, we note that this simple di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence methodology can be used
with overall industry level productivity to quantify the overall e⁄ect of trade reforms on
industry productivity. The ￿rst column in Panel 3 of Table 9 shows the results for this
speci￿cation. This exercise indicates that a reduction in tari⁄s from 60 percent to 20
percent increases average industry productivity by 8.2 log points. The latter e⁄ect is the
combined e⁄ect of improved average plant-level productivity and improved allocation,
where as discussed improved allocation accounts for 7.8 of the total 8.2 improvement.
As indicated, there is no exact decomposition of the role of market selection in this
context since it contributes to both increases in average plant-level productivity (the
results in the prior section) and improvements in allocation. Finding the overall contri-
bution of market selection would require more structure in modeling both the changes
of productivity and market shares of incumbents and the contribution of entering and
exiting plants.
327 Conclusion
We ￿nd that plant pro￿t margin fundamentals are important determinants of plant
exits. Our analysis goes further than the existing literature by analyzing the impact of
a rich set of pro￿t margin fundamentals rather than relying on proxies. In particular,
we ￿nd that higher physical productivity, higher demand, lower input costs and higher
mark-ups reduce the probability that plants exit. In exploring the role of trade reforms,
we ￿nd that lower e⁄ective tari⁄s increase the marginal impact of productivity, demand
shocks and input costs on plant exit. As a result, lower e⁄ective tari⁄s have changed
the nature of market selection and increased exit during the period of trade reform in
Colombia.
Given that all these ￿ndings point towards a greater impact of competitive forces on
plant selection due to trade reform, we then investigate the implied impact on average
productivity. For this purpose, we conduct counter-factual exercises that show what
productivity would had been if plant survival had continued as with the 1984 tari⁄s
compared to actual tari⁄ levels. In particular, we quantify the implied average plant-
level productivity using plant exit probabilities holding tari⁄s at their beginning of the
period levels and at their actual levels. Average plant-level productivity is about 3.3 log
points higher than it would have been in the absence of improved market selection. This
e⁄ect is substantial relative to the overall rise in average productivity of 12 log points
over this post reform period (Eslava et al. (2004), comparing aggregate TFP in 1992 to
1998).
The results, thus, suggest a truncation of the productivity distribution on the left due
to greater exit of less productive plants after trade reforms. Our ￿ndings are consistent
with the prediction in the Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) models, and other
related models, of an increase in the productivity threshold required for plant survival
after trade liberalization. This is consistent with Tre￿ er￿ s (2004) study, which ￿nds that
trade liberalization increases productivity in Canada. However, in contrast to our study,
Tre￿ er￿ s study does not focus on the impact of pro￿t margin fundamentals on exit or
on the impact of trade on market selection.
Moreover, we also ￿nd that trade reform is associated with an increase in within plant
productivity growth for incumbent plants and improved allocation of activity within sec-
tors. We estimate that the impact of the Colombian trade liberalization of the early
nineties on incumbent plant productivity growth is 2.8 log points, while it impact on
overall within sector reallocation is 7.8 log points. These latter ￿ndings are also quan-
33titatively important and ￿t in with the overall story of improved market competition
yielding increases in productivity through a variety of complementary channels. The
point that there are many potential channels of the impact of trade liberalization and
other reforms on productivity both at the plant- and the industry- levels must not be un-
derstated. We believe our current ￿ndings highlight the importance of market selection
as a channel for trade liberalization to improve productivity. A challenge for future work
is to ￿nd ways of integrating and assessing the relative importance of the many alter-
native channels through which trade liberalization, and more generally market reforms,
may impact the industrial structure of an economy.
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  Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 











Materials                      9.92 
(1.87) 
Output Prices  -0.11 
(0.58) 
Energy Prices  0.37 
(0.49) 
Material Prices  -0.03 
(0.46) 
Entry Rate  0.07 
(0.25) 
Exit Rate  0.09 
(0.28) 




Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations of the log of 
quantities and of log price indices deviated from yearly log producer 
price indices. The sample has been restricted to plants in three-digit 
sectors that have reports for more than 25 plants per year in average, 
and to plants also included in Table 2 (those for which TFP can be 
calculated). The entry and exit rates are the number of entrants divided 
by total plants and number of exiting plants divided by total number of 
plants. A plant that enters in t is defined as a plant that reported positive 
production in t but not in t-1, while a plant that exits in t is one that 
























Notes: This table reports standard deviations and correlation coefficients for different measures 
of TFP and for the plant-level output prices. All figures are simple means of statistics calculated 
at the 3-digit sector level. The exception is the total number of observations for the calculation 
of each correlation coefficient, reported in the last line, which includes all sectors. The factor 
elasticities used to estimate TFP (Column (1)) are obtained from a 2SLS estimation of the 
production function, as described in the text. The equivalent factor elasticities used for TFPC 
(Column (3)) are cost shares calculated at the three-digit sector level. For Column (4), factor 
elasticities are obtained from an OLS estimation of the production function. Meanwhile, TFP2 
in Column (2) uses the same factor elasticities as in column (1), but the price indices used to 
deflate output and materials are calculated at the three-digit sector level rather than at the plant 
level. Sector level price indices are calculated as the geometric mean of plant level price indices 
for a given 3-digit sector, using output shares as weights. Relative output prices RP1 are 
constructed as the log difference between plant level price indices and the aggregate log 
Producer Price Index, and reported in Column (5). 




















  0.7668  1  0.69 0.90 0.86 -0.65 
TFP deflating output and materials 
with sector-level prices (TFP2)  0.6079   1 
  0.53 0.40 -0.00 
TFP with factor elasticities equal to 
cost shares (TFPC)  0.7657     1 0.86  -0.64 
TFP with factor elasticities from 
OLS (TFPO)  0.6620       1  -0.72 
Output prices relative to PPI (RP1) 
  0.5604         1 
 
N     85,203 85,203 85,203 85,203  85,203  






2SLS  2SLS   
 
 































× Road Density 
   -1.2379
***
( 0.2213) 
















Notes: This table reports results from estimating demand functions. Robust standard  
errors are in parentheses. The 2SLS in Columns (2) and (3) use TFP as an instrument  
for the relative price. First Stage R
2 is in square brackets. The dependent variable is 
physical output in logs, and the regressor “Relative Price” is the log difference between 
plant-level price and the yearly PPI. The estimated coefficients do not vary across 
sectors, but all regressions include 2-digit sector dummies. The two-stage least squares 
regression in Column (3) includes region fixed effects.  The two-stage least squares 
regression in Column (2) instruments price with the 2SLS TFP measure, lagged one 
period. The road density measure included in Column (3) is the kilometers of paved 
roads per squared kilometer of area in the state in which the plant is located. An 
interaction between this index and the relative price is also included. This interaction is 
instrumented using an interaction between the plant’s TFP (lagged) and the road 
density index. The regression in Column (3) also controls for aggregate activity, given 
potential correlation with the increasing coverage of roads over time. Some 
observations are lost with respect to Table 2 due to lack of information on road density. 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 




     
Sector  Effects  YES YES YES 
Region Effects  NO  NO  YES 
 
Root MSE 
1.6169 1.7689 1.7199 
 
N 
73,697  73,697  73,697  




Lagged TFP  1.1745 
(0.7765) 
Lagged Demand Shock 
(Column 2 Table 3) 
10.6125 
(1.8268) 
Lagged Demand Shock 
(Column 3 Table 3) 
10.6468 
(1.8231) 
Lagged Demand Elasticity 
(Column 3 Table 3) 
-2.0428 
(0.1492) 
Reforms Other than Trade  0.4508 
(0.1220) 
Effective Tariffs  0.5599 
(0.3854) 
GDP Growth  0.0408 
(0.0121) 




Notes:  This table reports means and standard deviations of the 
variables used to estimate exit probabilities. TFP is calculated 
using factor elasticities from a 2SLS estimation procedure, while 
demand shocks and demand elasticities come from the estimations 
reported in Table 3. The Index of Other Reforms is constructed 
using all components of the Lora Overall Reform Index, except 
those included in the Trade Index. Each of the sub-components of 
Lora’s index has been re-scaled to be 0 in the year of less 
liberalization in Colombia and 1 in the year of most liberalization 
in Colombia. Effective Tariffs are available at the four-digit level, 
calculated from data by the National Planning Department. The 
sample is restricted to observations that enter the regressions in 




Table 5: Determinants of Exit Probability 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 











































Lagged Demand Shock  
(Column 2 Table 3)  




Lagged Demand Shock 
(Column 3 Table 3)  
     -0.0217
***
(0.0007) 
Demand Elasticity  
(Column 3 Table 3) 




       
Sector  Effects  YES YES  YES YES 
GDP  Growth  YES YES  YES YES 
       








N  57,886 57,886  57,886 57,886 
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from a Probit estimation of the probability of exit, where exit is 1 for plant 
i in year t if the plant produced in year t but not in year t+1. Robust standards errors in parentheses. Marginal effects 
are evaluated at mean values of all the independent variables. All specifications include sector effects at the 2-digit 
level as well as plant-level productivity, energy prices, and materials prices. Column (2) includes output prices. 
Column (3) includes a measure of demand shocks estimated using Column (2) in Table 3. Column (4) includes 
measures of the demand shock and demand elasticity estimated using Column (3) of Table 3. The sample is 
restricted to observations that enter the regression in Table 6. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Table 6: Determinants of Exit Probability in a Model with Reforms and Tariffs. 
 
  Ef. Tariffs at 
60% 
(1) 






Ef. Tariffs at 
60% 
(4) 


























































Lagged Demand Shock 









(0.0010)     
Lagged Demand Shock 
(Column 3 Table 3)   








Lagged Demand Elasticity  
(Column 3 Table 3) 



















Other Reforms Index  YES  YES    YES YES   
Interactions with 
Other Reforms Index  YES YES    YES YES   
Sector Effects  YES  YES    YES YES   
GDP Growth  YES  YES    YES YES   
N 57,886  57,886  57,886 57,886 57,886  57,886 
        
Notes: This table reports marginal effects and robust standards errors from a Probit estimation of the probability of exit where exit is 1 for plant i in year t if the plant produced in 
year t but not in year t+1. Robust errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are evaluated at mean values of all variables, except for effective tariffs. In Columns (1) and (3) effective 
tariffs are set at a value of 60%, while in Columns (2) and (4) they are set at 20%. Columns (3) and (6) report the difference between effects when tariffs are at 20% and at 60%. 
The specification includes sector effects at the 2-digit level, as well as plant-level productivity, energy prices, materials prices and demand shocks and elasticities.  Effective tariffs 
and interactions of effective tariffs with all of the plant-level regressors are also included. Similarly, we include an index of reforms other than trade reform, and interactions of this 
index with all of the plant-level regressors. The TFP measure is obtained using the factor elasticities from a 2SLS estimation procedure. The demands shock and demand elasticity 
measures used for this Table come from Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1%.   
Table 7:  Average TFP(t) Using Exit between t-1 and t as Projected by Exit Model 
Average TFPt  
(Using  Projected TFPit for Simulated Continuers and actual TFPit  for Actual Entrants) 
   All  Plants  1985 Incumbents 
Sample   Actual Tariffs  1984 Tariffs Difference Actual Tariffs  1984 Tariffs  Difference
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)    (6) 
                   
 1.1240   1.1221  0.0019  1.0875   1.0862    0.0013 
 (0.7947)   (0.7989)  [0.26]  (0.7837)   (0.7852)    [0.15]  1986-1991 
                
 1.1407   1.1080  0.0326  1.1144   1.0683    0.0462 
 (0.9373)   (0.9275)  [3.27]  (0.9402)   (0.9031)    [3.52]  1992-1998 
                
 1.1313   1.1160  0.0154  1.0973   1.0797    0.0176 
 (0.8602)   (0.8574)  [2.53]  (0.8441)   (0.8302)    [2.45]  1986-1998 
                
 
This table reports the simple mean of TFP for groups of plants simulated to participate in the market using the 
estimated probit model reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. Standard deviations in parentheses in Columns 
(1), (2), (4) and (5); T statistics for mean differences in square brackets in Columns (4) and (6). The probability 
that a plant exits is estimated using actual values of all independent variables, including tariffs, in the results 
reported in Columns (1) and (4), while tariffs are set at their 1984 value in the results reported in Columns (2) and 
(5). Figures in Columns (1)-(3) include plants that entered after 1985, while Columns (4)-(6) only include plants 




Table 8:  Descriptive Statistics of Simulated TFP in 1998 
 
  Actual Tariffs  1984 Tariffs 
   (1)  (2) 
    
Mean 1.1326  1.1050 
Standard Deviation  0.9743  0.9495 
1st Percentile  -1.0934  -1.1760 
50th Percentile  1.1016  1.0985 
    
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the simulated distribution of TFP for 1998. The simulation 
uses actual tariffs in Column (1) and 1984 tariffs in Column (2).  
 
 
 Table 9: Alternative Effects of Trade Reform on Aggregate and Plant-level 
 Productivity. 
 
Panel 1:  
Plant-level growth of TFP against the Change in Tariffs for the Plant’s Sector  
   




   
Sector effects  4-digits 
Year effects  Yes 
R
2 0.0129 
N  56,113 
   
Panel 2:  














Sector effects  3-digits 






3-digit Sector Productivity against Tariffs for the Sector 
   
 
Overall Sector Productivity 
(1) 









    
Sector effects  3-digits 3-digits 
Year effects  Yes Yes 
R
2 0.8268 0.7779 
N  336 336 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel 1 presents a regression at the plant level, controlling for sector 
effects (4-digit level) and for year effects. Panel 2 presents a plant-level regression of the share of sectoral 
output represented by the plant against the plant productivity, sectoral tariffs, and an interaction between 
productivity and tariffs, controlling for sector effects (3-digit level) and for year effects. Panel 3 presents 
are regressions at the 3-digit sector level, controlling for sector effects (3-digit level) and for year effects. 
Our industry productivity measure in Column (1) of panel 3 is the output-weighted plant-level log TFP and 
in Column (2) of that panel is the cross term of the Olley-Pakes decomposition of sector productivity. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 












84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Year
Effective tariffs St. dev. Effective tariffs Reform Index

















Actual tariffs 1984 tariffs Difference
 